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Abstract 
Besides material offshoring, economists have started to analyze the impact of service 
offshoring on domestic employment. Services are of particular interest since their significance 
has grown in terms of both quantity and quality. One decade ago, most services were 
considered non-tradable, but the emergence of new information and communication 
technologies has contributed to overcoming geographical distance. The move towards the 
liberalization of international service trade has further accelerated this process.  
The empirical part of this paper first calculates German service offshoring intensities on a 
sectoral basis using input-output data. This measurement represents the proportion of 
imported service inputs used in home production. Germany’s average service offshoring 
intensity more than doubled from 1991 to 2003. In a next step, the impact of service 
offshoring on the demand for heterogeneous labor in Germany is estimated at a sectoral level 
including 28 manufacturing sectors. The partial static equilibrium model is based on a 
variable unit cost function in the general translog form allowing for quasi-fixed input factors. 
Two different skill-levels are taken into account. The estimation results indicate that service 
offshoring reduced the relative demand for less-skilled labor in the German manufacturing 
sectors by on average -0.06 to -0.16% per year between 1991 and 2000. 
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1. Introduction 
Intensifying globalization processes have coincided with low economic growth rates and high 
unemployment in Germany especially in the 1990s. Globalization in the economic sense 
comprises the transnational movement of production factors, commodities and services, 
which is reflected in a higher integration of international goods, money and capital markets 
(Reining, 2003). Trade and investment flows, in particular, have increased, which often leads 
to the one-sided conclusion that growing globalization causes negative labor market effects. 
This popular belief, which could also contribute to the increasingly pessimistic attitude of the 
working population in Germany, demands academic clarification.  
Globalization processes have an impact on domestic labor markets via three main channels. 
First, integrated product markets intensify he international commodity and service trade 
which influences the home labor market. Second, domestic labor markets can also be affected 
by economic integration via Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the fragmentation of 
production. Both channels have an indirect effect on national labor markets, whereas the third 
channel focuses on the direct labor market integration via migration (Landesmann, 2000). 
Regarding offshoring-induced labor market effects, economists distinguish between 
quantitative labor market effects, i.e. the overall level of home employment, and qualitative 
aspects such as employment or income distribution. 
Offshoring is used as a general term to describe all kinds of entrepreneurial activities taking 
place in a country other than the domestic one in order to support a company’s business. 
Often, terms such as outsourcing, international outsourcing, offshoring or offshore 
outsourcing1 refer to the same phenomenon but, strictly speaking, do not mean the same. A 
clear definition of offshoring is required, beginning with a distinction between outsourcing 
and offshoring. Outsourcing asks for the “source” of production, i.e. if the input is produced 
by an internal source (self-production or subsidiary) or an external source (independent 
supplier/subcontracting) wherever the source might be located geographically. Offshoring, on 
the other hand, asks for the “shore”, or the country of production, i.e. if the input is produced 
at home or abroad regardless of the source. Figure 1 shows the 4 possible combinations of 
both criteria: (a) internal production in the home country (captive home production), (b) 
external production in the home country (onshore outsourcing), (c) internal production abroad 
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 Fragmentation and even foreign direct investment (FDI) is also used. 
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(captive offshoring or FDI) and (d) external production abroad (offshore outsourcing or 
international outsourcing). Offshoring comprises both internal and external production in a 
foreign country (c and d).  
In the US, economists have started to consider the damaging potential of offshoring on 
domestic employment. Samuelson (2004) argued with a theoretical Ricardian model that 
offshoring might provoke negative domestic labor market effects when the trade partner has 
productivity gains in its initially import-competing sector. That means that the trade partner 
gains some of the comparative advantage that was previously limited to the domestic 
economy. In this case, technological innovation could permanently reduce the per capita 
income in the country of origin (Samuelson, 2004). Free trade advocate Alan Blinder’s 
(2007a) estimations on the potential offshorability of 30 to 40 million American service jobs 
is quoted lately in newspaper articles, such as “Pain from free trade spurs second thoughts” in 
the Wall Street Journal on March 28th 2007 (Wessel and Davis, 2007) or “Free trade's great, 
but offshoring rattles me” in the Washington Post on May 6th 2007 (Blinder, 2007b).  
Recently, the newer phenomenon of service offshoring seems to have spread to Germany. The 
discussion has become more relevant due to the geographical and cultural proximity of the 
new Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) that have joined the EU. Services are of 
particular interest since their significance has grown in terms of both quantity and quality. 
One decade ago, most services were considered non-tradable, but the emergence of new 
information and communication technologies (ICT) has contributed to overcoming 
geographical distance.  
While the above classification refers to offshoring in general, the following paragraph aims at 
giving an appropriate definition of service offshoring. Service trade has been fostered by 
global drivers that have appeared simultaneously. Thus, developments in ICT have led to what 
is sometimes called the digital-electronic revolution. For a long time, services, unlike 
commodities, were considered intangible and invisible and thus not storable or transferable.1 
Hence, direct contact between the producer and consumer of a service was required (uno-
actu-principle). According to the uno-actu-principle either the consumer of a service had to 
seek the producer out (e.g. retail, wholesale, tourism sector) or vice versa (e.g. transport 
sector, waste disposal). Recent developments in ICT have made it possible to uncouple 
                                                 
1
 This distinction between services and commodities should not be understood in a strict sense. Some 
services have features of commodities and are tangible (e.g. the printed report of a management 
consultant) or visible (e.g. theatre). Beyond this, most commodities depend on service inputs in their 
production and vice versa. 
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information from its physical memory, rendering the transfer of huge amounts of data 
possible within a few seconds (‘disembodied services’). Thus, the generality of the uno-actu-
principle has been called into question. Besides the developments in ICT, the move towards 
the liberalization of international service trade has further accelerated this process. 
Service offshoring in the broader sense comprises all kinds of foreign service activity of a 
multinational company (MNC) aimed at supporting its domestic production. The motives 
behind an offshoring decision can be market-oriented, cost-oriented, or procurement-oriented. 
Service offshoring is expected to have the potential for harming employment when formerly 
home-produced services are transferred for cost reasons. Therefore, my definition of service 
offshoring in the narrower sense focuses on cost-oriented motives: 
“Service offshoring designates the provision of service inputs from a foreign supplier that are 
produced abroad mainly for cost reasons and re-imported to the home country. Here, the foreign 
procurement either happens externally, via an independent supplier (offshore outsourcing), or 
internally within the multinational company (captive offshoring).”  
2. Literature Overview 
Empirical research on service offshoring and possibly related employment effects is 
indispensable as it can give ideas about the direction and the extent to which offshoring has 
influenced labor demand. However, the service offshoring debate in Germany is not yet well 
established. Even in the Anglo-Saxon countries there is shortage of empirical research. The 
impact of service and material offshoring on the domestic employment level for the relevant 
ICT-period has been empirically measured at a sectoral level for the US (e.g. Amiti and Wei, 
2004, 2006), the UK (Amiti and Wei, 2005) and Germany (Schöller, 2007a, b).  
German empirical studies that focus on service inputs and their related effects on the national 
markets are rare. Falk and Koebel (2002), for instance, only consider the impact of 
domestically purchased services and imported material inputs on the national labor demand 
structure. Moreover, they use data from 1978 to 1990 which does not cover the relevant ICT-
period. Görzig and Stephan (2002) analyze the impact of outsourcing on firm-level 
performance, but do not differentiate between domestic and foreign service purchases. The 
McKinsey Global Institute report, for instance, measures the welfare gain of service 
offshoring but does not clearly reveal the underlying method (Farrel, 2004; McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2005). Schöller (2007a, b) studies the impact of service offshoring on labor demand 
and finds evidence of a negative impact of service offshoring on German manufacturing 
employment between 1991 and 2000. 
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The effects of material offshoring on the relative demand for heterogeneous labor have been 
analyzed for the first time by Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999). They find that imported 
material inputs increased the relative demand for skilled labor in the US manufacturing 
sectors between 1979 and 1990. Falk and Koebel (2002) and Geishecker (2002) studied the 
effects of material offshoring on the demand for less-skilled labor in Germany. Falk and 
Koebel find no evidence that unskilled labor is substituted for imported materials in the 
manufacturing sectors between 1978 and 1990. Geishecker finds that material offshoring had 
a negative impact on the demand for less-skilled workers in German manufacturing sectors 
between 1991 and 2000, but skill-biased technological change is at least as important as 
offshoring to explain the decrease of the relative demand for less-skilled labor.  
Strauss-Kahn (2004) finds that imported material inputs had a negative impact on the demand 
for unskilled workers in the French manufacturing sectors in the period of 1977 to 1993. 
Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005) demonstrate a strongly negative material offshoring-induced 
effect on unskilled labor in the manufacturing sectors for the UK between 1982 and 1996. 
Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) analyze the impact of offshoring on workers with different 
educational attainments for Sweden between 1995 and 2000. They distinguish between 
offshoring to low-income and high-income countries and find that offshoring to low-income 
countries tends to shift labor demand away from domestic workers with an intermediate level 
of education. 
None of the aforementioned studies consider the effects of service offshoring. My 
contribution is to distinguish between service and material offshoring when analyzing the 
impact on the demand for heterogeneous labor. Offshoring intensities measure the proportion 
of imported service and material inputs used in home production; they are calculated on a 
sectoral basis using input-output data. I include 28 manufacturing sectors for the period 
between 1991 and 2000, and distinguish between production and non-production workers.1 A 
variable unit cost function in the general translog form is specified following Geishecker 
(2002, 2006). 
The structure of the paper is the following. The next chapter examines how offshoring 
intensities are measured and shows the development of German service and material 
offshoring intensities between 1991 and 2003. German offshoring intensities are then 
compared to UK and US intensities. Chapter 4 proceeds with the impact of service offshoring 
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 A further study distinguishing between different levels of educational instead of occupational 
attainment is planned. 
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on the demand for less-skilled labor. The empirical model and its specification are explained 
before presenting the estimation results.  
3. Service Offshoring Intensity  
3.1 Two Different Measures of Service Offshoring Intensity 
The following analysis for Germany uses input-output data from the Federal Statistical Office 
which originally comprises 71 sectors. I consider all 36 manufacturing sectors plus 7 selected 
service sectors (see Appendix I). The primary sector (sectors 1-3) and the sectors ‘mining’ and 
‘quarrying’ of the secondary sector (sectors 4-8) are dropped, as they generally do not 
represent offshoring sectors. The selection of the 7 service sectors out of 27 includes tradable 
business activities in the broader sense according to the aggregation of Kalmbach et al. (2005) 
except for the wholesale sector1. Consumer-related2 and social services3 are not considered, 
since the former in general do not represent typical offshoring services and the latter are not 
tradable. Business activities comprise ‘other business activities’ in a narrower sense (sector 
62), as well as the following 6 sectors: post and telecommunications; financial mediation 
(except insurance and pension funding); activities related to financial mediation; rental of 
machinery and equipment; computer and related activities; research and development (sectors 
54, 55, 57, 59-61). 
I calculate two different measures of offshoring intensity (a) and (b). The service offshoring 
intensity OSSist(a) measures the share of service import s by sector i at time t in total non-
energy inputs used by sector i at time t and is calculated as follows: 
(     )( ) ( - )
t
ist
t
imported input purchases of service s by sector iOSS a
total non energy inputs used by sector i
=
    
      
 
The service offshoring intensity OSSit(a) for sector i at time t is calculated by taking the sum 
over all OSSist(a): 
( )
s
istitOSS a OSS (a)= ∑  
The denominator contains all 36 non-energy manufacturing inputs, plus the 7 service sectors 
selected above (see Appendix 1). German input-output data differentiates between 
                                                 
1
 The sector ‘wholesale, trade and commission excl. motor vehicles’ (sector 46) was dropped due to 
strong fluctuations in the data between 1991 and 1995. 
2
 Sectors within the classification of the Federal Statistical Office: 45, 47-53, 56, 58, 69-71 
3
 Sectors within the classification of the Federal Statistical Office: 63-68 
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domestically purchased inputs and imported inputs, whereas import data at a sectoral level is 
not available for the US and the UK according to Amiti and Wei (2004, 2005, 2006). 
Therefore, they apply the methodology of Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) who calculate 
offshoring intensities of material imports to the US. This second measure of service 
offshoring intensity OSSist(b) for a given sector i at time t is a proxy for the proportion of the 
imported service input s used in home production. Besides the OSSist(a) measure, I also 
calculate the OSSist(b) measure for Germany to allow for international comparability. The 
second measure is defined as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( - ) + 
t t
ist
t st st st
input purchases of service s by sector i imports of service sOSS b
total non energy inputs used by sector i production imports - exports
   
=    
   
          
      
 
The first bracket calculates the share of the purchased service input s in total non-energy 
inputs for sector i at time t. However, the first ratio does not distinguish between domestically 
and foreign purchased service inputs, while service offshoring solely focuses on services from 
a foreign source. Therefore, the second bracket calculates the share of total imported service s 
(numerator) in the entire domestic disposability of this service s (denominator), which is 
composed of home production plus imports minus exports at time t. This data is retrieved 
from the input-output tables. The service offshoring intensity OSSist(b) of service s in sector i 
is calculated by multiplying both ratios. This proxy assumes the same overall import share of 
service s, regardless of sectoral differences. In Germany, for instance, the overall import share 
of other business activities was 4.5% in 2003. Hence, an import share of 4.5% is assumed for 
each sector i. 
The service offshoring intensity OSSit(b) for sector i at time t is calculated by taking the sum 
over all OSSist(b): 
( )
s
istitOSS b OSS (b)= ∑  
The sectoral service offshoring intensity OSSit should not be confused with OSSst, which 
represents the average offshoring intensity of a certain service s across all sectors i. This is 
calculated by aggregating the respective OSSist, weighted by their sectoral output, which is: 
* ( / )
i
st ist it tOSS OSS Y Y= ∑ , where 
i
t itY Y=∑ . 
Adding all OSSst yields the average service offshoring intensity OSSt over all sectors i and 
services s at time t. The material offshoring intensities OSMt are calculated analogously.  
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The definition of the offshoring intensity suffers from three related shortcomings. The first 
two caveats concern both offshoring intensity measures, whereas the last one only holds for 
the OSSt(b) measure. First, the measures underestimate the actual offshoring values, since 
import prices are generally lower than the actual purchase prices of these services. Second, 
the total non-energy inputs only include the purchased inputs, but not the self-produced inputs 
used by sector i. Third, the application of the same import share for each sector s (in the 
second bracket) in OSSt(b) is not accurate, since not every sector uses imports to the same 
extent. Thus, the offshoring intensity cannot be exactly measured (Amiti and Wei, 2005). 
Anyhow, the offshoring intensities, especially OSSt(a), present a good measure for the 
proportion of imported service inputs being used in home production at time t.  
3.2 Results 
The first column of Table 1 presents the average service offshoring intensities OSSst 
(weighted by sectoral output) of the 7 selected services s over all 43 sectors i in 1991, 2000 
and 2003. The next column shows the (unweighted) mean, standard deviation, as well as the 
minima and maxima over the 43 sectors. The 1991 and 2000 data is in unrevised form, 
whereas the 2003 data is revised. Both are not fully comparable due to changes in the 
classification1. The average service offshoring intensity OSSt(a) has more than doubled from 
1.47% in 1991 to 3.17% in 2000. At the services level, computer and related activities grew 
strongly from the 2nd smallest share of 0.03% in 1991 to the 2nd largest share of 0.60% in 
2000. Other business activities have almost quadrupled their intensities from 0.37% in 1991 
to 1.44% in 2000. The last three service sectors (computer and related activities, research and 
business development, and other business activities) that are typically associated with service 
offshoring formed more than a third (2.31%) of the total OSSt(a) in 2000. The revised 2003 
intensities differ somewhat from the 2000 data, especially in financial mediation and related 
activities, which constitute a much higher share in 2003. This is probably due to the data 
revision, as bank charges are now added to the sector of financial services. 
Figure 2 plots the development of the average OSSt(a) and OSMt(a) intensities in Germany 
between 1991 and 2003. The service offshoring intensity has grown considerably by 8.49% 
per year from 1.47% in 1991 to 3.90% in 2003 possibly due to the increased use of ICT. The 
material offshoring intensity has risen by 0.78% per year from 17.29% in 1991 to 18.98% in 
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 The revision of the input-output tables integrates, for instance, all the changes of the national 
accounts revision of 2005 and the new service statistics of the Federal Statistical Office.  
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2003. The CAGR between the low level year 1993 and 2003 is 2.78%. The stronger growth 
between 1993 and 2000 can be explained by the fall of the iron curtain and the subsequent 
FDI towards the CEEC, and likewise by the growing significance of the Asian markets. Over 
the whole period, the material offshoring intensities seem to have stagnated. An interpretation 
would be that the process of material offshoring, which has already started in the 1980s, has 
probably reached its capacity whereas service offshoring has not realized its full potential yet. 
Finally, an international comparison between Germany, the UK and the US follows. Data for 
the UK and the US are based on the studies of Amiti und Wei (2004, 2005, 2006). One could 
object that comparability of OSSit and OSMit is not given, since the respective sectoral 
classifications differ and are more disaggregated for the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, 
such differences disappear in OSSt and OSMt, as they represent a weighted aggregation (by 
sectoral output) of all sectoral offshoring intensities. Comparability of the three countries then 
requires that similar manufacturing and service sectors are chosen. There should be no 
problem with the manufacturing sector, since all manufacturing industries are included in the 
three countries. Country-specific differences could only arise in the selection of the service 
sectors. Table 2 shows that the selected services are similar with respect to their activities. All 
services have an equivalent in the other countries which allows for comparison. 
Table 3 compares the average German service and material offshoring intensities with UK 
and US intensities for the period of 1992 to 2001. Only the four columns on the right hand 
side using the offshoring (b) measure are comparable. UK data is not directly available, but 
was reconstructed from Figure 2 in Amiti and Wei (2005). Regarding service offshoring the 
UK shows the highest intensities. Between 1992 and 2001, they were on average 0.5%-points 
higher than the German OSSt(b) and reached a peak of 2.60% in 2000. This is remarkable, as 
one would expect service offshoring to be more relevant for the UK due to its former colonial 
ties and the lower linguistic barriers. The US intensities, both in the older (Amiti and Wei, 
2004) and the recent calculation (Amiti and Wei, 2006) are far below the German level and 
were always less than 1%. Nevertheless, they follow an increasing trend. Germany shows the 
highest CAGR (1992-2001) of 9.75% compared to the UK (7.55%) and the US (5.60% resp. 
6.14%).  
As regards material offshoring, in 2001, the UK had the strongest intensity (28.09%), 
followed by Germany (19.88%) and the US(I) (11.47%). Over the entire period, both German 
and US intensities were much lower than the UK intensities. The old and recent OSMt(b) 
calculations for the US strongly diverge. The old US(I) calculation has much lower 
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intensities, whereas recent US (II) measurements are closer to the German levels. OSMt(b) in 
the US grew nearly continuously between 1992 and 2000/2001, unlike Germany and the UK. 
In the UK, it grew slightly until 1995/1996 and fell back to its initial level showing no clear 
trend. The German OSMt(b) started at a very high level in 1991 and fell to a low in 1993 
before growing constantly until 2000.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Empirical Model 
A variable unit cost function CV is specified following Geishecker (2002, 2006) 
    HS LS
KCV CV( w ,w ,Y , , T )
Y
=                                                                                            (1.1) 
where wHS and wLS are the exogenous wages for the variable input factors high skilled labor 
LHS and less-skilled labor LLS. Y denotes the output. Capital is considered a quasi-fixed input 
factor in the form of the capital coefficient K/Y. The technology shifter 
  T T( RD / Y ,OSS ,OSM )=  is a linear function of R&D intensity RD/Y and offshoring 
intensities OSS and OSM, and represents a change of the production function due to 
technological progress or international trade (offshoring). 
The following general transcendental logarithmic (translog) form1 of a variable unit short-
run cost function as introduced by Brown and Christensen (1981) is used, allowing for l 
variable input factors (Pj : j = 1, …, l) and m quasi-fixed input factors (Zj : j = 1, …, m) (for 
the theoretical model see Appendix 2): 
0
1 1
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1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
1 1
ln   ln ln ln
1 1 1(ln ) ln ln ln ln
2 2 2
ln ln ln ln ln ln
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= + + +
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+
∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑∑
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∑ ∑                         j
                   (1.2) 
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 The translog cost function in the empirical work on trade and the demand for heterogeneous labor 
was first introduced by Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and applied by e.g. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996), Geishecker (2002, 2006), Strauss- Kahn (2004), Hijzen et al. (2005) and Ekholm and Hakkala 
(2006). 
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In this partial static equilibrium framework, there are two variable input factors, l = 2, namely 
P1 = wHS and P2 = wLS. I denote the corresponding coefficients by αHS and αLS. Also, there is 
only one quasi-fixed input factor, m = 1, namely Z1 = K/Y. Now (1.2) specializes to: 
2
2
2 2
ln ln
1ln ln ln ln
2
1 1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2 2 2
1 (ln ) ln ln ln ln
2
ln ln ln ln
ln (ln )
( ) ( )
K
KK YHS YLS
HSK LSK YK
Y YYHS HS LS LS
HSLS HS LS HSHS HS LSHS LS HS LSLS LS
HS LS
HS LS
K K
Y Y
KCV w w
Y
w w w w w w
K Y w Y w
Y
K
w w Y
Y
Y Y
δ ζ ζ
ζ ζ η
α α α α β γ
γ γ γ γ
θ
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
+
0 + =
21 ln                                                                                           (1.3)
2
ln ln
ln ln
ln ln
T TT TY
RDHS HS RDLS LS
OSSHS HS OSSLS LS
OSMHS HS OSMLS L
T T T Y
w w
OSS w OSS w
OSM w OSM w
RD RD
Y Y
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
+
+
+ +
+
+ +
+
ln
S
TKT
K
Y
ρ+
For symmetry reasons the following parameter restrictions are imposed:  
jk kjγ γ= and jk kjδ δ= . 
In order for homogeneity of degree one in input prices to hold, the following linear 
restrictions are required:  
1
l
j
j
α =∑  
 0
l l l
jk
j j j
jk kjγ γ ζ= = =∑ ∑ ∑                                                                                               for all k 
 0
l l
Yj Tj
j j
ζ θ= =∑ ∑  
Applying Shephard’s Lemma yields the respective factor demand which is the factor’s share 
in total variable costs as the cost function is in logarithmic form:  
ln /
ln /
∂ ∂ ∂
= = = =
∂ ∂ ∂
HS HS HS
HS
HS HS HS HS
w wCV CV CV CV S
w w w CV w CV
L
                                                           (2.1) 
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ln /
ln /
∂ ∂ ∂
= = = =
∂ ∂ ∂ LS
LS LS LS
LS
LS LS LS
w w LCV CV CV CV S
w w w CV w CV
                                                              (2.2) 
where LHS and LLS is the demand for high-skilled and less-skilled labor with LHS= /∂ ∂ HSCV w  
and LLS= / LSCV w∂ ∂ . SHS and SLS is the cost share of LHS and LLS in variable costs CV. Since in 
equations (2.1) and (2.2) wHS and wLS are the only variable costs, CV is determined by the sum 
of the products of the variable factor costs with their respective factors:  
= + =HS HS LS LSCV w L w L wL , where w designates the average wage per labor L, regardless 
of the qualification.  
Thus, SHS and SLS can be determined as follows: 
= =
+ HS HS
HS HS HS HS
HS
LS LS
w wS
w w L wL
L L
L
    (2.1’)             = =
+ HS HS
LS LS LS LS
LS
LS LS
w wS
w w L wL
L L
L
    (2.2’) 
Since LHS and LLS are the only variable inputs, and thus 1+ =HS LSS S , only one cost share is 
linearly independent. The first partial derivative of equation (1.3) with respect to ln LSw  yields: 
ln 1/ 2 ln 1/ 2 ln ln
ln
ln ln
LS LS HSLS HS LSHS HS LSLS LS
LS
YLS LSK RDLS OSSLS OSMLS
CV S w w w
w
RD OSS OSMKY
Y Y
α γ γ γ
ζ ζ θ θ θ
∂
= = + + +
∂
+ ++ + +
  
                              (3.1) 
According to (2.2’), a decrease of SLS can reflect both a fall in LLS and/or a fall in wLS, which 
implies according to (2.1’) a rise in SHS and thus an increase in LHS and/or in wHS. Hence, the 
composite term SLS can be considered as the relative demand for less-skilled labor. Due to 
symmetry and homogeneity, we have w HSLS LSLS LSLS HSHSγ γ γ γ γ= = = − = − . Hence equation 
(3.1) leads to the following model: 
,
,
,
ln ln lnHS it itw itY KLS it LS
itLS it
it
it it itRD OSS OSM
it
w KS Y
w Y
RD OSS OSM
Y
α γ ζ ζ
θ θ θ ε
= + + +
+ + + +
                                                             (3.2) 
where i designates the sector dimension, t the time dimension, and εit the idiosyncratic error 
term.  
One expects a lower SLS and thus a lower cost share of LLS in variable costs CV when relative 
wages for high-skilled labor as part of CV rise ( 0wγ < ). The composite term SLS is correlated 
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with ( / )HS LSw w , since ( / )=LS LS LSS w L wL . Despite the definitional relationship between SLS 
and relative wages, the relative wage variable should be included as it controls for the 
variation in the relative wages of SLS, whereas the variation in relative employment of SLS is 
controlled by the other exogenous variables (see Geishecker 2002, 2006). The sign of the 
coefficient Yζ of output Y is not unambiguously predictable. An increase in Y normally leads 
to a higher overall wage bill and hence to larger CV. If the cost increase is equally distributed 
among less-skilled and high-skilled labor, there should be no influence on SLS. If the wage bill 
of high-skilled labor increases over-proportionally, e.g. due to a better bargaining power, this 
results in a higher LHS and/or wHS, and SLS is expected to fall ( 0Yζ < ). A higher capital 
coefficient is predicted to reduce SLS, since capital can be considered as a substitute for less-
skilled labor ( 0Kζ < ). The influence of RD/Y, OSS, OSM on SLS is not easily predictable, as 
all variables could be substitutes for less-skilled (  0,  0,  0RD OSS OSMθ θ θ< < < ) or for high-
skilled labor (  0,  0,  0RD OSS OSMθ θ θ> > > ). One might rather expect a demand shift away 
from less-skilled labor. 
4.2 Empirical Specification 
The following section measures the impact of service and material offshoring on the relative 
demand for less skilled labor in the manufacturing sector including 28 manufacturing1 and 7 
service sectors in a panel regression analysis. Due to the input-output data revision and a 
possible structural break, my analysis includes only the unrevised data from 1991 to 2000. In 
a first step, the correct estimation model is selected. In the presence of unobserved time-
constant sector-specific effects ic , one considers the following panel data model 
α β ε= + + +it it i ity x c . We distinguish two cases. (1.) If ic  (e.g. productivity) is correlated with 
some explanatory variables itx  (e.g. OSS), usual pooled OLS regression would be biased and 
inconsistent. Transforming the pooled OLS using first differences or the fixed effects 
estimator, washes these time-invariant effects ic  out. Thus, first differences and fixed effects 
models allow for a correlation between ic  and some itx , and ic  is estimated as part of the 
intercept ( )α + ic . (2.) If ic  is not correlated with some itx , it is considered a stochastic 
variable or random effect. In such a case, ic is assumed to be independent and identically 
                                                 
1
 The 36 manufacturing sectors of the input-output classification (see Appendix 1) are aggregated to 28 
sectors to match the wage and employment data (see Appendix 3). 
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distributed over the panels (sectors) and considered as part of the composite error term 
it i itcν ε= + . The existence of random effects is tested using the extended Breusch-Pagan test 
of Baltagi and Li (1990) for unbalanced panels. The null hypothesis of no unit specific 
random effect is rejected (Prob>chi2=0.0000). Furthermore, the Hausman test (1978) is run to 
test the null hypothesis that ic is uncorrelated with some itx . H0 cannot be rejected with 
Prob>chi2=1.0000, so that the GLS random effects estimator is used in the following.  
5. Estimation Results 
In a first step, the pooled OLS model is tested for possible heteroscedasticity by performing a 
White test of the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against unrestricted forms of 
heteroscedasticity. H0 can be rejected (Prob>chi2=0.0000).1 Secondly, a test for 
autocorrelation in ε it  of linear panel-data models is run as discussed by Wooldridge (2002). 
The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is also rejected (Prob>F=0.0000). 
Therefore, the estimations include the “robust cluster” option which produces standard errors 
robust to both heteroscedasticity (Huber-White sandwich estimators) and any form of intra-
cluster correlation. Since the clusters are sectors in our case, this option corrects for intra-
sector serial correlation and any other correlation provoked by common intra-sector shocks. 
Some specifications integrate fixed year effects tD , i.e. time-specific cross-sectoral effects, 
such as common shocks influencing all sectors at time t.  
The results of the GLS random effect estimators are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. 
Relative wages, real output, capital, and OSMt influence SLS negatively in column 1 at the 1% 
significance-level. R&D-intensity and OSSt have a positive impact on SLS, but none of them is 
significant. When fixed year effects are included in column 2 the coefficient signs remain the 
same, but only relative wages and the capital coefficient are significant.  
Employment effects are not always instantaneous, which is why one-period time lags of the 
independent variables are added in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. The coefficient of 
ln( / )HS LS tw w  remains negative, while ln( / )HS LS t-1w w has a positive sign. The overall effect 
remains negative and the null hypothesis H0 of no joint significance is rejected (p>F=0.0000). 
The overall impact of real output on SLS remains negative, too, which is only significant when 
                                                 
1 A further test for heteroscedasticity in the random effects model is run as suggested by Greene 
"Econometric Analysis" (1993, page 395). This test amounts to a likelihood ratio test of the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity. H0 is rejected (Prob>chi2=0.0000). The STATA command hetgrot is 
used as proposed by Nunziata (see http://www.decon.unipd.it/personale/curri/nunziata/software.htm). 
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no fixed year effects are added. The capital coefficient also has an overall negative impact on 
SLS in both specifications. The overall effect of the R&D-intensity is positive in column 4, but 
the F-tests cannot reject H0 of no joint significance. OSSt has a negative effect on the relative 
demand for less-skilled labor which is offset by the positive impact of OSSt-1. The overall 
effect is positive (p>F=0.0000) in both columns. Material offshoring has a negative overall 
effect, which is significant in both specifications.  
5.1 Outliers 
In the case of short time series and a limited number of sectors outliers could lead to biased 
results. Therefore, the model is re-estimated dropping the two identified outliers – the ‘office 
accounting, computer machinery’ sector and the ‘pharmaceuticals’ sector – as their service 
offshoring intensities are extremely high compared to the average sample. The results are 
found in columns 5 to 8 of Table 4. All variables except for OSSt of columns 5 and 6 maintain 
their coefficient signs compared to columns 1 and 2. Surprisingly, OSSt now shows 
(insignificant) negative coefficients.  
Columns 7 and 8 add one-period lags of each explanatory variable. Most of the coefficient 
signs are comparable to those of columns 3 and 4. OSSt becomes very high and negative 
which is significant at the 10%-level in both columns. The null hypothesis of no joint 
significance of OSSt and OSSt-1 cannot be rejected at the 10%-level in both specifications. 
Material offshoring still has a negative overall impact on SLS, which is only significant when 
fixed year effects are not added (column 7). 
5.2 Additional Control Variable  
The offshoring variables might be swelled due to other omitted correlated variables. I 
addressed this problem by adding the shares of total imports in total output by sector in 
columns 9 to 12 of Table 4 as suggested by Amiti and Wei (2006). The higher the import 
share of a sector, the more probable is service and material offshoring. The import shares 
variables are highly significant and negatively correlated with SLS. The coefficient signs and 
magnitudes of relative wages, real output and capital coefficient hardly change. Considering 
service offshoring, the instantaneous effect remains negative in all four specifications and the 
overall negative effect of service offshoring remains the same when import share is added. 
Most surprisingly, material offshoring now has a positive impact on SLS, which is significant 
for OSMt when fixed year effects are added, and for the lagged OSMt-1.  
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The correlation matrix in Appendix 4 shows that import shares are to more than 80% 
correlated with material offshoring. In the case of imperfect collinearity between import 
shares and material offshoring, the estimators are still efficient and unbiased. The problem is 
that collinearity creates large estimator variances and hence large confidence intervals. In the 
case of collinearity, the joint influence of the (inter-)correlated independent variables material 
offshoring and import share on the dependent variable SLS is given, but the estimation of the 
individual coefficients is difficult to obtain. This is not due to a misspecification of the model, 
but due to insufficient information in the data.  
5.3 Endogeneity  
The random effects estimator is only valid when strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables 
is assumed. It is plausible that more productive sectors aim at increasing their technology 
shifter and thus self-select into offshoring and/or spending more on R&D. Similarly less 
productive sectors might hope to benefit from offshoring and/or R&D in order to increase 
their technology shifter (see Amiti and Wei, 2006). Furthermore, the relative wage variable 
might be treated as endogenous if sectoral wages and the relative demand for less-skilled 
labor are simultaneously determined (see Geishecker, 2006). Finally, there might be no 
significant cross-sectional variation in the relative wage changes over time, as some of the 
variation might be due to different skill levels within the sectors (price changes), while some 
could be due to a skill-upgrading of the whole sector (quality changes) (see Berman, Bound 
and Griliches, 1994). Hence, these variables are tested for endogeneity using the first three 
period lags as instruments.1 Exogeneity of ln( / )HS LS tw w  cannot be rejected with a Chi2(1) p-
value = 0.6188. Concerning the technology shifter T, R&D-intensity has a Chi2(1) p-value = 
0.1456, OSSt a Chi2(1) p-value = 0.1867 and OSMt a Chi2(1) p-value = 0.1369. The relative 
wage variable should be treated as exogenous, whereas the three variables of the technology 
shifter show quite low p-values and can thus not unambiguously be treated as exogenous. 
Specifying all three technology shifter variables as potentially endogenous yields the Chi2(4) 
p-value = 0.0779. Thus, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected and the three are treated 
as endogenous. 
                                                 
1
 This homoscedasticity-robust test is carried out using the Stata command ivreg2 with the endog 
option. The endog option tests for endogeneity of one or more regressors under the null hypothesis 
that the specified endogenous regressors are exogenous (see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007).  
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Therefore, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variables estimator is used to 
control for potential endogeneity of R&D-intensity and the offshoring variables (as well as 
import share variable). I use the first three lags of potentially endogenous variables as 
instruments for (RD/Y)t, OSSt and OSMt (and (IM/Y)t). The results are shown in Table 5. All of 
the specifications add fixed year effects and exclude the above identified two outliers.  
The first 4 columns apply the consistent 2SLS random-effects estimator due to Baltagi and 
Chang (2000). The standard errors cannot be corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. The first two specifications in columns 1 and 2 only regard instantaneous 
effects of the explanatory variables. Service offshoring has a significant negative effect on the 
relative demand for less-skilled labor, whereas the impact of material offshoring is only 
negative when import shares are not added (column 1). Columns 3 and 4 additionally use one-
period lags of all explanatory variables except for the instrumented variables. The 
significantly negative effect of service offshoring is confirmed, while the effect of material 
offshoring depends on the consideration of import shares.  
For comparison, columns 5 to 8 of Table 5 use a 2SLS fixed-effects (within) estimator which 
produces standard errors robust to both heteroscedasticity (Huber-White sandwich estimators) 
and any form of intra-cluster correlation.1 The fixed effects estimators are consistent, but less 
efficient than the random effects estimators. Columns 5 and 6 consider only instantaneous 
effects of the explanatory variables. Service offshoring has a negative coefficient sign which 
becomes significant when the additional control variable import share is added in column 6. 
Material offshoring influences the relative demand of less-skilled labor negatively in column 
5, but turns positive in column 6. Under consideration of additional one-period lags of the 
remaining explanatory variables in columns 7 and 8, service and material offshoring almost 
show the same results compared to the random effects estimators in columns 3 and 4. Hence, 
the consistent fixed effects estimators controlling for potential endogeneity of the offshoring 
and import variables confirm the statements that have been derived from Table 4. 
Another alternative is to apply the dynamic General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator as 
proposed by Arellano-Bond (1991). This GMM estimator uses the lagged levels of the 
dependent and the predetermined variables, and the differences of the strictly exogenous 
variables as instruments. First differences remove the assumed fixed sector effects ic . 
Additionally, the one-period lag of the dependent variable ∆SLS is included, making the model 
                                                 
1
 The Stata command xtivreg2 is used. See Schaffer and Stillman (2007) for further information. 
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dynamic. R&D-intensity, service and material offshoring, as well as import shares are treated 
as predetermined variables. Predetermined variables assume that E[xirεit] ≠ 0 for r < t, but 
E[xirεit] = 0 for all r ≥ t. Thus, idiosyncratic shocks εit in t have an influence on subsequent itx . 
The results are shown in Table 6.  
The specifications in columns 1 to 4 consider the instantaneous effects of the strictly 
exogenous variables relative wage, real output and capital coefficient. As before, the latter 
show all negative coefficient signs, that are significant in most cases. Service offshoring has a 
negative effect on ∆SLS, which is significant at the 1%-level. The negative impact of material 
offshoring becomes positive, when import shares are included in the specifications (columns 
3 and 4). The Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid in columns 1 and 21, hence one might prefer the specifications with import shares. All of 
the four specifications show no second-order autocorrelation, which would have made the 
estimators inconsistent.  
Columns 5 to 8 add one-period lags of the strictly exogenous variables. The overall negative 
effects of the latter remain the same, but the overall effect of relative wages becomes much 
smaller as ln( / )∆ HS LS t-1w w shows large positive coefficient signs. Service offshoring still has 
a significantly negative effect on ∆SLS with smaller coefficient signs. Again, the negative 
effects of material offshoring turn positive when import shares are added. The Sargan test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid in the four 
specifications, and none of them shows second-order autocorrelation.  
5.4 Discussion of Results 
The results show that service offshoring had an overall negative effect on the relative demand 
for less-skilled labor in the German manufacturing sectors from 1991 to 2000. Including 
import shares and fixed year effects, the results are interpreted. The overall coefficients of the 
GLS Random Effects Estimations are -1.18 and -1.24, respectively. Controlling for 
endogeneity, the coefficients of service offshoring in the instrumental variables 2SLS 
estimations vary between -2.03 and -2.39. Applying the GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic 
estimators, the coefficients are lower and are-1.31 and -0.91, respectively. Between 1991 and 
2000, the CAGR of service offshoring was 6.67% for the manufacturing sector. Thus, service 
offshoring reduced the demand for less-skilled labor by on average -0.06 to -0.16% per year.  
                                                 
1
 The rejection of the null hypothesis could also be due to heteroscedasticity. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Since the new tradability of services has made services vulnerable to relocation, the public 
awareness of service offshoring and its potential labor market effects has increased 
significantly. This paper first aims at giving an understanding what service offshoring 
concretely means. The empirical part of this paper first calculates German service offshoring 
intensities on a sectoral basis using input-output data. This measurement represents the 
proportion of imported service inputs used in home production. German OSSt(a) more than 
doubled from 1.47% in 1991 to 3.90% in 2003. The comparison between German, UK and 
US intensities reveals that German OSSt(b) are only slightly lower than UK intensities and 
show the highest CAGR between 1992 and 2001. In a next step, the impact of service 
offshoring on the demand for heterogeneous labor in Germany is estimated at a sectoral level 
including 28 manufacturing sectors. The partial static equilibrium model is based on a 
variable unit cost function in the general translog form allowing for quasi-fixed input factors. 
Two different skill-levels are taken into account. The estimation results indicate that service 
offshoring reduced the relative demand for less-skilled labor in the German manufacturing 
sectors by on average -0.06 to -0.16% per year between 1991 and 2000. 
There are some caveats concerning studies on service offshoring and their effects on labor 
demand. First, long-term effects cannot be predicted yet because of the novelty of the 
phenomenon. Thus, positive effects are possible in the long term, when domestic companies 
reinvest their efficiency gains in new jobs. Second, the relationship between offshoring and 
employment is complex as it links foreign trade, home production and gross fixed investments 
which can provoke direct and indirect as well as static and dynamic effects (Tüselmann, 
1998). Hence, the sign and extent of offshoring in existing studies should not be considered 
universally valid (Tüselmann, 1998). Third, the diverse offshoring motives do only associate 
labor market effects, since the underlying cause for the domestic employment reduction – 
especially in the case of cost-oriented motives – is not offshoring, but high labor costs. 
Offshoring then is rather a symptom than a cause of domestic labor market problems (Roling, 
1999). Fourth, the main cause of the increase in service offshoring is not clearly determinable. 
Service offshoring can be traced back not only to increased service trade as a consequence of 
globalization but also to technological progress (ICT). Despite the caveats the estimation 
results allow for the conclusion that service offshoring reduced the relative demand for less-
skilled labor in the German manufacturing sectors between 1991 and 2000 when a partial 
static equilibrium framework is assumed.  
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Table 1: Service Offshoring Intensities in Germany (1991, 2000 and 2003) 
OSS1991(a)
Service s OSSs1991              
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Post and telecommunications 0.60% 0.54% 2.92% 0.00% 19.24%
Financial intermediation (except insurance & pension fund.) 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.10%
Activities related to financial intermediation 0.22% 0.18% 0.82% 0.00% 4.20%
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.10% 0.12% 0.32% 0.00% 2.15%
Computer and related activities 0.03% 0.04% 0.13% 0.00% 0.76%
Research and development 0.13% 0.29% 1.48% 0.00% 9.58%
Other business activities 0.37% 0.24% 0.37% 0.03% 2.25%
Total OSS1991(a) 1.47% 1.43% 3.31% 0.12% 19.53%
OSS2000(a)
Service s OSSs2000              
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Post and telecommunications 0.56% 0.43% 2.51% 0.00% 16.53%
Financial intermediation (except insurance & pension fund.) 0.04% 0.03% 0.05% 0.00% 0.35%
Activities related to financial intermediation 0.26% 0.26% 1.21% 0.00% 6.78%
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.15%
Computer and related activities 0.60% 0.72% 3.14% 0.00% 19.73%
Research and development 0.27% 0.65% 3.45% 0.00% 22.42%
Other business activities 1.44% 0.61% 1.71% 0.00% 10.85%
Total OSS2000(a) 3.17% 2.70% 5.68% 0.00% 23.00%
OSS2003(a)
Service s OSSs2003              
(weighted 
average)
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Post and telecommunications 0.69% 0.47% 2.97% 0.00% 19.51%
Financial intermediation (except insurance & pension fund.) 0.19% 0.17% 0.10% 0.00% 0.56%
Activities related to financial intermediation 0.45% 0.71% 4.15% 0.00% 27.13%
Renting of machinery and equipment 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Computer and related activities 0.53% 0.64% 2.05% 0.00% 12.28%
Research and development 0.33% 0.67% 3.08% 0.00% 19.27%
Other business activities 1.71% 0.72% 1.96% 0.00% 12.54%
Total OSS2003(a) 3.90% 3.39% 6.68% 0.00% 27.55%
 
Source: Own calculations, Data: Federal Statistical Office, input-output tables 1991 and 2000 (unrevised form) 
und 2003 (revised form).  
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Table 2: Comparison of Selected Services in Germany, the UK and the US 
Germany UK US
Post and telecommunications Telecommunications Telecommunications 
Financial intermediation, 
activities related to financial 
intermediation
Banking and finance, insurance 
and pension funds and auxiliary 
financial services
Insurance, Finance
Renting of machinery and 
equipment
Renting of machinery Other Business services
Computer and related activities Computer services Computing and Information
Research and development Research and development Other Business services
Other business activities Legal activities, accountancy 
services, market research and 
management consultancy 
Other Business services
Other business activities Architectural activities and 
technical consultancy
Other Business services
Other business activities Advertising Other Business services
Other business activities Other business services Other Business services
 
Source: German classification: Federal Statistical Office, UK classification: UK National Accounts, US 
classification: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.  
NB: Other business services in the US (IMF classification) include merchanting and other trade-related services, 
operational leasing services and miscellaneous business, professional and technical services. 
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Table 3: Offshoring Intensity in Germany, the UK and the US  
Year Germany (a) Germany (b) UK US(I) US(II)
1991 1.47% 1.01% - - -
1992 1.47% 0.98% 1.35% 0.49% 0.18%
1993 1.46% 0.98% 1.58% 0.53% 0.18%
1994 1.41% 0.94% 1.64% 0.56% 0.20%
1995 2.03% 1.01% 1.62% 0.58% 0.20%
1996 2.15% 1.11% 1.82% 0.61% 0.21%
1997 2.52% 1.33% 1.66% 0.64% 0.23%
1998 2.70% 1.40% 2.00% 0.66% 0.24%
1999 3.01% 1.59% 2.22% 0.75% 0.29%
2000 3.17% 1.74% 2.38% 0.76% 0.29%
2001 3.61% 2.26% 2.60% 0.80% -
2002 3.56% 2.21%  - -
2003 3.90% 2.05%  
CAGR 92-01 10.48% 9.75% 7.55% 5.60% 6.14%
Year Germany (a) Germany (b) UK US(I) US(II)
1991 17.29% 18.49% - - -
1992 15.58% 16.46% 28.19% 8.74% 11.72%
1993 14.43% 14.93% 29.49% 9.24% 12.68%
1994 14.66% 16.00% 29.77% 9.92% 13.41%
1995 15.43% 16.89% 30.70% 10.47% 14.18%
1996 15.26% 16.90% 30.66% 10.38% 14.32%
1997 15.93% 18.32% 29.67% 10.51% 14.55%
1998 16.70% 18.97% 28.00% 10.48% 14.94%
1999 16.85% 19.05% 28.00% 10.78% 15.55%
2000 18.73% 21.51% 28.56% 11.94% 17.33%
2001 16.77% 19.88% 28.09% 11.47% -
2002 16.21% 19.69% - - -
2003 18.98% 20.45%
CAGR 92-01 0.82% 2.12% -0.04% 3.07% 5.01%
Service Sectors 7 7 9 5 5
Manufacturing 
Sectors 36 36 69 96 96
Service Offshoring Intensity 
Material Offshoring Intensity 
 
Source: Own calculations for Germany (a) and (b). Weighted average across all sectors i by outputs at time t.  
Germany (a): ∑s [(imported input purchases of service s by sector i)t/(total non energy inputs used by sector i)t]. 
Other measures (b): ∑s [(input purchases of service s by sector i)t/(total non energy inputs used by sector i)t]* 
[(imports of service s)t/(productionst + importsst - exportsst). Data: input-output tables, Federal Statistical Office. 
Revised data only for 2001-2003.  
Calculations for the UK: Amiti and Wei (2005). Data: input-output tables, UK National Statistics, IMF: Balance 
of Payments Statistics. NB: UK data is not directly available, but can be reconstructed from Figure 2 in Amiti 
and Wei (2005). 
Calculations for the US: (I): Amiti and Wei (2004); (II): Amiti and Wei (2006). Data: input-output tables, US 
National Statistics, IMF: Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Table 4: GLS Random Effects Estimations (1991-2000) 
Dependent variable: SLS,t         
 GLS Random-effects: all sectors GLS Random-effects: w/o outliers1) GLS Random-effects: w/o outliers plus import share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ln(wHS/wLS)t    
 
ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 
 
ln(real Y)t  
 
ln(real Y)t-1 
 
ln(K/Y)t  
 
ln(K/Y)t-1  
 
(RD/Y)t  
 
(RD/Y)t-1  
 
(OSS)t  
 
(OSS)t-1  
 
(OSM)t 
 
(OSM)t-1 
 
(IM/Y)t  
 
(IM/Y)t-1  
 
-0.2388*** -0.1607*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0961*** -0.0119 
(0.000) (0.656) 
 
 
-0.1430*** -0.0703** 
(0.000) (0.021) 
 
 
0.0910 0.1330 
(0.642) (0.427) 
 
 
0.2518 0.4892 
(0.623) (0.241) 
 
 
-0.2605*** -0.0509 
(0.007) (0.709) 
 
-0.3404*** -0.2733*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.0807* 0.0762** 
(0.056) (0.036) 
0.1285* -0.0429 
(0.055) (0.426) 
-0.2043*** 0.0106 
(0.001) (0.819) 
0.1068 -0.0850 
(0.141) (0.101) 
-0.2083*** -0.0018 
(0.000) (0.960) 
0.0006 0.1851 
(0.998) (0.308) 
-0.0109 -0.1019 
(0.956) (0.562) 
-0.4582 -0.5476 
(0.554) (0.182) 
1.4125*** 1.3999*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.0510 0.0542 
(0.427) (0.479) 
-0.1827** -0.1488 
(0.029) (0.125) 
 
-0.2901*** -0.1768*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0785*** -0.0016 
(0.001) (0.951) 
 
 
-0.1202*** -0.0496 
(0.000) (0.102) 
 
 
0.3187*** 0.3123*** 
(0.004) (0.000) 
 
 
-1.6591 -1.0376 
(0.386) (0.406) 
 
 
-0.3058*** -0.1040 
(0.002) (0.474) 
 
-0.3796*** -0.2985*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.1104** 0.0969** 
(0.016) (0.013) 
0.1596** -0.0099 
(0.035) (0.831) 
-0.2135*** -0.0089 
(0.003) (0.830) 
0.1451* -0.0418 
(0.082) (0.343) 
-0.2281*** -0.0235 
(0.001) (0.511) 
0.1185 0.1902 
(0.570) (0.339) 
0.0630 0.0181 
(0.792) (0.935) 
-2.1106* -1.2424* 
(0.060) (0.092) 
0.3752 -0.0207 
(0.711) (0.978) 
-0.1022* 0.0119 
(0.065) (0.870) 
-0.1655* -0.1622 
(0.057) (0.113) 
 
-0.2645*** -0.1634*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0895*** -0.0131 
(0.000) (0.576) 
 
 
-0.1127*** -0.0455** 
(0.000) (0.032) 
 
 
-0.0088 0.0085 
(0.948) (0.959) 
 
 
-1.7404 -1.1790 
(0.275) (0.207) 
 
 
0.0263 0.1933*** 
(0.670) (0.009) 
 
 
-0.1538*** -0.1441*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
-0.3367*** -0.2576*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.1043*** 0.0918*** 
(0.006) (0.008) 
0.1164* -0.0287 
(0.072) (0.537) 
-0.1818*** 0.0021 
(0.004) (0.954) 
0.1064 -0.0533 
(0.119) (0.224) 
-0.1939*** -0.0154 
(0.001) (0.630) 
0.0835 0.1377 
(0.715) (0.488) 
-0.1082 -0.1280 
(0.728) (0.665) 
-1.8227* -1.0271* 
(0.076) (0.077) 
0.1194 -0.2169 
(0.878) (0.713) 
-0.0209 0.1040** 
(0.663) (0.015) 
0.1128* 0.1223* 
(0.054) (0.054) 
-0.0453 -0.0634** 
(0.168) (0.030) 
-0.1084*** -0.0938*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No  Yes 
Joint significance:           
ln(wHS/wLS)t + ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 = 0 
ln(real Y)t + ln(real Y)t-1 = 0 
ln(K/Y)t + ln(K/Y)t-1 = 0 
(RD/Y)t + (RD/Y)t-1 = 0 
OSSt + OSSt-1 = 0 
OSMt + OSMt-1 = 0 
(IM/Y)t + (IM/Y)t-1 = 0  
  p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.9969 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0845 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.4584 
p>F=0.0116 
p>F=0.5783 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0804 
  p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0003 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.3965 
p>F=0.1652 
p>F=0.0695 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.7394 
p>F=0.0714 
p>F=0.2337 
p>F=0.1782 
p>F=0.1285 
  p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.9264 
p>F=0.2054 
p>F=0.1538 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.5170 
p>F=0.0087 
p>F=0.7861 
p>F=0.2090 
p>F=0.0192 
p>F=0.0000 
Observations 280 280 252 252 260 260 234 234 260 260 234 234 
R-squared (within) 0.59 0.71 0.65 0.72 0.63 0.73 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.83 
Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses). 1) Outliers: ‘office accounting, computer machinery’ and ‘pharmaceuticals’  
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables 2SLS Estimations (1991-2000) 
Dependent variable: SLS,t       
 Instrumental Variables 2SLS:  
GLS Random Effects w/o outliers1) 
Instrumental Variables 2SLS:  
Fixed Effects w/o outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ln(wHS/wLS)t    
 
ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 
 
ln(real Y)t  
 
ln(real Y)t-1 
 
ln(K/Y)t  
 
ln(K/Y)t-1  
 
(RD/Y)t  
 
(OSS)t  
 
(OSM)t 
 
(IM/Y)t  
 
-0.1816*** -0.1546*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0173 -0.0222 
(0.321) (0.162) 
 
 
-0.0491** -0.0324* 
(0.011) (0.065) 
 
 
-0.0492 -0.3739* 
(0.828) (0.065) 
-2.0042** -2.4414*** 
(0.036) (0.004) 
-0.2153*** 0.2740*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 -0.1667*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.1661*** -0.1446*** 
(0.007) (0.008) 
-0.0045 0.0148 
(0.943) (0.791) 
0.0769 -0.0499 
(0.210) (0.386) 
-0.0894 0.0352 
(0.146) (0.539) 
0.0525 -0.0332 
(0.371) (0.537) 
-0.1079* -0.0233 
(0.054) (0.648) 
-0.0244 -0.2132 
(0.917) (0.309) 
-2.0377** -2.3426*** 
(0.037) (0.007) 
-0.1719** 0.3317*** 
(0.014) (0.000) 
 -0.1617*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.2146*** -0.1853*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
 
-0.0544 -0.0374 
(0.336) (0.403) 
 
 
-0.0822 -0.0431 
(0.134) (0.285) 
 
 
-0.0611 -0.4135* 
(0.713) (0.088) 
-1.5154 -2.1878* 
(0.346) (0.061) 
-0.2718 0.2223 
(0.196) (0.148) 
 -0.1659*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.2048*** -0.1675*** 
(0.003) (0.008) 
-0.0103 0.0077 
(0.886) (0.904) 
0.0674 -0.0486 
(0.306) (0.324) 
-0.1230* 0.0184 
(0.076) (0.734) 
0.0394 -0.0348 
(0.509) (0.384) 
-0.1257** -0.0319 
(0.044) (0.451) 
-0.0520 -0.2266 
(0.803) (0.472) 
-1.4662 -2.0295* 
(0.328) (0.051) 
-0.2414 0.2969* 
(0.251) (0.064) 
 -0.1637*** 
 (0.000) 
Fixed year effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Joint significance:        
ln(wHS/wLS)t + ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 = 0 
ln(real Y)t + ln(real Y)t-1 = 0 
ln(K/Y)t + ln(K/Y)t-1 = 0 
  p>F=0.0006 
p>F=0.2915 
p>F=0.0028 
p>F=0.0029 
p>F=0.4651 
p>F=0.0054 
  p>F=0.0025 
p>F=0.2010 
p>F=0.0736 
p>F=0.0055 
p>F=0.5829 
p>F=0.2200 
First stage results:         
Test of excluded instruments:  
(RD/Y)t 
(OSS)t  
(OSM)t 
(IM/Y)t  
Shea Partial R-squared:  
(RD/Y)t 
(OSS)t  
(OSM)t 
(IM/Y)t  
Hanson J statistic2) P-value 
     
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
 
 
0.5128 
0.5576 
0.3276 
 
Χ2(6)=0.80 
 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
 
0.5853 
0.5720 
0.2620 
0.5099 
Χ2(8)=0.21 
 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
 
 
0.4506 
0.5590 
0.2920 
 
Χ2(6)=0.78   
 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0000 
 
0.5265 
0.5739 
0.2381 
0.5359 
Χ2(8)=0.37 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
R-squared     0.56 0.69 0.59 0.71 
Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses). 
1) GLS Random effects estimators are not corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms. 
2) Over-identification test of all instruments 
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Table 6: GMM Estimations (1991-2000) 
Dependent variable: ∆SLS,t       
 GMM Arellano-Bond dynamic estimator w/o outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆ln(wHS/wLS)t    
 
∆ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 
 
∆ln(real Y)t  
 
∆ln(real Y)t-1 
 
∆ln(K/Y)t  
 
∆ln(K/Y)t-1  
 
∆(RD/Y)t  
 
∆(OSS)t  
 
∆(OSM)t 
 
∆(IM/Y)t  
 
∆SLS,t-1 
 
-0.1249*** -0.0996*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0047 -0.0102 
(0.700) (0.455) 
 
 
-0.0275** -0.0312** 
(0.019) (0.029) 
 
 
0.1633** 0.1579** 
(0.029) (0.037) 
-1.3872*** -1.2113*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.0204 -0.0229 
(0.320) (0.273) 
 
 
0.6426*** 0.6920*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.1449*** -0.1223*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
-0.0215* -0.0235* 
(0.069) (0.064) 
 
 
-0.0371*** -0.0393*** 
(0.001) (0.003) 
 
 
0.0296 0.0371 
(0.701) (0.631) 
-1.4644*** -1.3079*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.0553** 0.0491* 
(0.031) (0.062) 
-0.0487*** -0.0458*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.6426*** 0.6920*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.2566*** -0.2372*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.2253*** 0.2249*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.0150 0.0002 
(0.630) (0.995) 
-0.0066 -0.0150 
(0.814) (0.623) 
-0.0297 -0.0141 
(0.325) (0.655) 
0.0026 0.0025 
(0.916) (0.929) 
-0.0441 -0.0841 
(0.571) (0.289) 
-0.7934*** -0.8497*** 
(0.008) (0.006) 
-0.0413** -0.0511** 
(0.040) (0.012) 
 
 
0.7625*** 0.8013*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.2678*** -0.2505*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.2143*** 0.2115*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
-0.0400 -0.0248 
(0.192) (0.439) 
0.0069 -0.0023 
(0.804) (0.939) 
-0.0509* -0.0358 
(0.086) (0.245) 
0.0134 0.0094 
(0.576)  (0.731) 
-0.0999 -0.1199 
(0.188) (0.112) 
-0.8878*** -0.9148*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
0.0105 0.0028 
(0.687) (0.915) 
-0.0339*** -0.0328*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
0.7213*** 0.7476*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Joint significance:        
∆ln(wHS/wLS)t + ∆ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 = 0 
∆ln(real Y)t + ∆ln(real Y)t-1 = 0 
∆ln(K/Y)t + ∆ln(K/Y)t-1 = 0 
    p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.1568 
p>F=0.0632 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.4442 
p>F=0.7224 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0116 
p>F=0.0049 
p>F=0.0000 
p>F=0.0707 
p>F=0.1380 
Sargan test1) p>Χ2=0.05 p>Χ2=0.08 p>Χ2=0.69 p>Χ2=0.71 p>Χ2=0.58 p>Χ2=0.72 p>Χ2=0.97 p>Χ2=0.98 
H0: no 2nd order autocorrelation p>z=0.70 p>z=0.34 p>z=0.59 p>z=0.28 p>z=0.43 p>z=0.27 p>z=0.47 p>z=0.28 
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 208 
Source: Own calculations. p*<0.1, p**<0.05, p***<0.001 (p-values in parentheses). 
1) Null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
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Figure 1: Classification of Offshoring  
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Source: Own illustration. 
 
 
Figure 2: Offshoring Intensity of Intermediate Inputs in Germany  
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Source: Own calculations. Federal Statistical Office, input-output tables (1991-2003). Weighted average across 
all sectors i by outputs at time t. Revised input-output tables only for 2001-2003.  
Calculations for Germany (a): ∑s [(imported input purchases of service s by sector i)t/(total non energy inputs 
used by sector i)t].  
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Appendix 1: Sectoral Classification 
Manufacturing Sectors (36 Sectors)
1 Food products
2 Beverages
3 Tobacco products
4 Textiles
5 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur
6 Leather, leather products and footwear
7 Wood and products of wood and cork
8 Pulp and paper
9 Paper products
10 Publishing
11 Printing
12 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
13 Pharmaceuticals
14 Chemicals exluding pharmaceuticals
15 Rubber products
16 Plastic products
17 Glass and glass products
18 Ceramic goods and other non-metallic mineral products
19 Iron and steel
20 Non-ferrous metals
21 Metal castings
22 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
23 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
24 Office, accounting and computing machinery 
25 Electrical machinery and apparaturs, n.e.c. 
26 Radio, television and communication equipment 
27 Medical, precision and optical instruments
28 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
29 Other transport equipment
30 Manufacturing n.e.c.
31 Recycling
32 Electricity, steam and hot water supply 
33 Gas and gas supply
34 Collection, purification and distribution of water
35 Construction site and civil engineering
36 Construction installation and other construction
Service Sectors (7 Sectors)
37 Post and telecommunications
38 Financial intermediation except insurance and pension funding
39 Activities related to financial intermediation 
40 Renting of machinery and equipment
41 Computer and related activities
42 Research and development
43 Other business activities
 
Source: Input-output tables, Federal Statistical Office. 
NB: Some of the 36 manufacturing sectors of the input-output classification have been merged to match the 
wage and employment data which leads to a total of 28 sectors. The sectors are: 1-2, 8-9, 13-14, 15-16, 17-18, 
19-21 and 35-36. 
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Appendix 2: Theoretical Model 
A linearly homogeneous production function F with constant returns to scale is described as 
follows: 
2 2
1 2( ,..., ), 0, 0, 0        
∂ ∂ ∂
= = > = < = >∂ ∂ ∂∂n j jj jkj jj k
F F FY F X X F F F
X X XX
  for all j, k =1,…, n    (1) 
where Y is the output and X is a vector of homogeneous inputs j. Due to the homogeneity 
assumption, multiplying the inputs with a constant λ (λ=2,3,…) augments production by λz, 
where z is constant and positive: ( )λ λ=zY F X . 
The labor demand functions are based on the cost minimization of a firm. On the assumption 
that a firm maximizes its profits and the production function has convex isoquants, total costs 
are calculated by summing up the products of optimal input demands and their respective 
factor prices. The total cost function dual to (1) can be described as follows: 
CT = G(Y, P1,…, Pn)                                                                                                               (2) 
where Pj is the input price of Xj, n is the total number of inputs, and 
1=
=∑
n
j j
j
CT P X is total cost 
conditional on the level of output Y.  
Using Shephard’s Lemma1, the conditional input demand function, holding output Y constant, 
can be derived: 
( , )
* ( , ) jdj j j
j
CT P Y
X X P Y
P
∂
= = ∂
 
                                                                                                 (3) 
Allen (1938) defines the elasticity of substitution σjk between input factor jX and input factor 
kX  as a consequence of an exogenous change in relative factor prices, holding output 
constant, as follows:  
ln( / ) ln( / )
ln( / ) ln( / )σ
∂ ∂
= = =∂ ∂
j j jk k k
jk
j jk k jk
X X X X F F
P P F F YF
                                                                              (4) 
If the factor price for input jX  increases relative to the factor price for input kX , i.e. ( / )j kP P  
rises, jX  will be substituted for input kX , i.e. ( / )jkX X  increases. By this definition, jkσ  is 
                                                 
1 According to Shephard’s Lemma (1953), the factor demand Xj* is determined by the first partial 
derivative of the cost function with respect to the corresponding factor price Pj, regardless of the kind 
of production function. 
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always nonnegative. The macro-economic explanation is that if the supply of other inputs kX  
grows stronger than the supply of jX , ( / )j kP P will increase due to changes in the relative 
scarcity of the production factors (the scarcer factor jX  becomes, the more expensive it 
becomes relative to input kX ). Firms adapt to these supply changes by using more of input 
factor kX  relative to input factor jX . Since output Y is considered constant, input factor jX  
is thus substituted for input factor kX . 
Under the assumption that Y is linearly homogeneous and therefore ( , ) ( ,1)j jCT P Y YCT P= , 
the partial derivatives of the total cost function yield the elasticity of substitution σjk as shown 
by Uzawa (1962). Thus, the static equilibrium elasticity of substitution is as follows: 
*
*
σ = jkjk
j k
CT CT
CT CT
                                                                                                                       (5) 
where /= ∂ ∂j jCT CT P  and /= ∂ ∂jk kjCT CT P . 
If one consider a partial state equilibrium as introduced by Brown and Christensen (1981), 
only the variable factor inputs are in the state equilibrium, and the remaining inputs Z are 
fixed or quasi-fixed. The introduction of quasi-fixed input factors relaxes the assumption of 
full static equilibrium. Then, the following variable unit cost function CV, conditional on Y 
and the remaining inputs Z, is assumed:  
CV = H(Y, P1,…, Pl, Z1,…, Zm),                                                                                        (6) 
where Zj is considered a subset of Xj which is not necessarily at a static equilibrium level,        
l + m = n and 
1=
=∑
l
j j
j
CV P X . 
The partial static equilibrium elasticity of substitution conditional on the level of output Y and 
the levels of fixed factors Z is derived from the variable cost function:  
*
*
jk
j k
P
jk
CV CV
CV CV
σ =                                                                                                                       (7) 
where /j jCV CV P= ∂ ∂  and /jk kjCV CV P= ∂ ∂ . σ Pjk  represents the elasticity of substitution 
only between the variable factor inputs, but not between the fixed and variable factors or 
among the fixed factor inputs. 
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Appendix 3: Data 
German input-output tables are disaggregated to 71 sectors following the three-digit and, for 
some sectors, the four-digit NACE Rev. 1.1 classification (German Federal Statistical Office:  
unrevised input-output tables 1991 to 2000 in current prices; revised input-output tables 2001 
to 2003, Fachserie 18 Reihe 2). Due to the input-output data revision of 2005 my empirical 
analysis only includes the unrevised data from 1991 to 2000. The 36 manufacturing sectors of 
the input-output classification are aggregated to 28 sectors in order to match the available 
wage and employment data. Thus, the empirical analysis covers 10 observations over time for 
28 manufacturing industries which leads to a total number of 280 observations per variable.  
Skill-specific data is needed to calculate both SLS and relative wages. Labor data at a sectoral 
level is divided into the two occupational groups production workers and non-production 
employees. It is assumed that production workers rather represent less-skilled labor, whereas 
non-production employees represent high-skilled labor. As SLS corresponds to the share of 
less-skilled labor in the total wage bill of companies, the numerator of (2.2’) consists of total 
sectoral wages for less-skilled labor, while the denominator of (2.2’) includes the sum of total 
sectoral wages and salaries for all workers and employees. Sectoral wages are calculated by 
dividing total sectoral gross wages and salaries by the number of workers and employees, 
respectively. The data is retrieved from the STATIS-Archive-CDs of the German Federal 
Statistical Office.  
Output data Y is derived from the input-output tables. I calculated real output using sectoral 
producer price indices from the German Federal Statistical Office.1 Capital input K is matched 
using the sectoral gross capital stock at replacement costs from the German Federal Statistical 
office.2 R&D expenditures are retrieved from the OECD STAN Industrial Database 
(ANBERD, R&D Expenditure in Industry (ISIC Rev.3), Vol. 2006 release 01). 
                                                 
1
 Producer price indices are available at several aggregation levels (28, 107 and 225 sectors). Since 
some producer prices at the required input-output aggregation level were not available, I used 
producer prices of more disaggregated sectors (within the same industry) as a proxy, because similar 
price trends can be expected there. This procedure was also used in a few cases where some years 
were missing.  
2
 The two sectors ‘publishing & printing’ and ‘electricity, steam and hot water supply & gas and gas 
supply’ don’t have data available at the input-output aggregation level. Therefore, disaggregation 
is acquired weighting the gross capital stock data by its sectoral output share to match the 
input-output classification. 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs   Mean  Std Dev   Min Max 
 
SLS, t 
 
SLS, t-1 
 
∆SLS, t 
 
∆SLS, t-1 
 
ln(wHS/wLS)t    
 
ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 
 
∆ln(wHS/wLS)t    
 
∆ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 
 
ln(real Y)t  
 
ln(real Y)t-1 
 
∆ln(real Y)t  
 
∆ln(real Y)t-1 
 
ln(K/Y)t  
 
ln(K/Y)t-1  
 
∆ln(K/Y)t  
 
∆ln(K/Y)t-1  
 
(RD/Y)t  
 
(RD/Y)t-1  
 
∆(RD/Y)t  
 
∆(RD/Y)t-1  
 
(OSS)t  
 
(OSS)t-1  
 
∆(OSS)t  
 
∆(OSS)t-1  
 
(OSM)t 
 (OSM)t-1 
 
∆(OSM)t 
 
∆(OSM)t-1 
 
(IM/Y)t  
 
(IM/Y)t-1  
 
∆(IM/Y)t  
 
∆ (IM/Y)t-1  
 
 
280         0.51543      0.1477318     0.1276571      0.7946503 
 
252        0.518068      0.1475775     0.1344832      0.7946503 
 
252     -0.0065768      0.0100813   -0.0400257      0.0288794 
 
224     -0.0069347       0.010067   -0.0400257      0.0288794 
 
280       0.4511249       0.141195      0.084199      0.8631626 
 
252       0.4496741      0.1418264      0.084199      0.8631626 
 
252       0.0034072      0.0251887    -0.170119      0.1001551 
 
224       0.0037175      0.0262969    -0.170119      0.1001551 
 
280     10.22857      1.145036     7.038784    12.43754 
 
252     10.21179      1.141581     7.038784    12.43754 
 
252       0.0168947      0.0929153   -0.2697411     0.5948229 
 
224       0.0050173      0.0659223    -0.245923     0.2060642 
 
280       0.0789171      0.6704588   -1.317293     2.048574 
 
252       0.0920558      0.6645754   -1.317293     2.013558 
 
252       0.0024701      0.1056753   -0.6314123     0.3579574 
 
224       0.0163985      0.0788209   -0.2342387     0.2873528 
 
280       0.0215588      0.0369407     0.0002741     0.1650839 
 
252       0.0221163      0.0379578     0.0002741     0.1650839 
 
252     -0.0006694      0.0061361   -0.0360919     0.0293593 
 
224     -0.0002826      0.0055418   -0.0304632     0.0293593 
 
280       0.0059753      0.0098477            0      0.064962 
 
252       0.0057885      0.0093515            0      0.064962 
 
252       0.0003377      0.0021111   -0.0050447     0.0181091 
 
224       0.0003365      0.0022163   -0.0050447     0.0181091 
 
280       0.2479504      0.1398093     0.0447137     0.6498865 
 
252       0.2427849      0.1350766     0.0472041     0.6059635 
 
252       0.0072969      0.0229603   -0.0781186      0.120617 
 
224       0.0053484      0.0224285   -0.0781186      0.120617 
 
280       0.4029574      0.4686724            0     2.703693 
 
252       0.3941235      0.4566247            0     2.703693 
 
252       0.0172437      0.0867111   -0.8650627     0.6814198 
 
224       0.0210121      0.0664386   -0.1097091     0.6814198 
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix 
                                 
 
ln(wHS/wLS)t ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 ln(real Y)t ln(real Y)t-1 ln(K/Y)t  ln(K/Y)t-1  (RD/Y)t  (RD/Y)t-1  (OSS)t  (OSS)t-1  (OSM)t (OSM)t-1  (IM/Y)t  (IM/Y)t-1  
ln(wHS/wLS)t    
 
ln(wHS/wLS)t-1 
 
ln(real Y)t  
 
ln(real Y)t-1 
 
ln(K/Y)t  
 
ln(K/Y)t-1  
 
(RD/Y)t  
 
(RD/Y)t-1  
 
(OSS)t  
 
(OSS)t-1  
 
(OSM)t 
 
(OSM)t-1 
 
(IM/Y)t  
 
(IM/Y)t-1  
 
 1.0000 
 
 0.9841    1.0000 
 
-0.1684   -0.1665     1.0000 
 
-0.1714   -0.1708     0.9967     1.0000 
 
-0.3507   -0.3223   -0.3659   -0.3562     1.0000 
 
-0.3359   -0.3049   -0.3602   -0.3627     0.9874     1.0000 
 
 0.4613     0.4755     0.0353     0.0262   -0.0556   -0.0407     1.0000 
 
 0.4645     0.4748     0.0338     0.0191   -0.0587   -0.0330     0.9871     1.0000 
 
 0.1538    0.1727   -0.0834   -0.1015     0.1861     0.2270     0.2427     0.2762     1.0000 
 
 0.1281     0.1492   -0.0744   -0.0949     0.1794     0.2241     0.2100     0.2462     0.9815    1.0000 
 
 0.6783     0.6764   -0.0580   -0.0685   -0.2334   -0.2018     0.4868     0.5045     0.1840    0.1771     1.0000 
 
 0.6732     0.6729   -0.0566  - 0.0648   -0.2345   -0.2084    0.4941     0.5106     0.1709    0.1640     0.9878     1.0000 
 
 0.7028     0.7028   -0.3121   -0.3141   -0.0509   -0.0314     0.3316     0.3495     0.3492    0.3445     0.8325     0.8264     1.0000 
 
 0.6944     0.6915  -0.2990   -0.3070   -0.0652   -0.0358     0.3171     0.3418    0.3541    0.3550     0.8342     0.8297     0.9843     1.0000 
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